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Introduction
Both the United States12 and the United Kingdom3 publish data on the Balance Sheet of Households and 
Non-profit Organisations. The U.S. has been publishing these data since at least 1995 and the U.K. more  
recently since 2002. Eurostat, the European Union’s statistical agency, does not yet collect these data in the 
same format. In November 2011 Eurostat together with participants of the OECD and the ECB published a 
report of a Task Force which focussed on the household perspective and distribution aspects of income,  
consumption and wealth4. The report foresees that such households’ balance sheet data are unlikely to be 
available before 2020.
The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  study  the  available  data  from the  U.S.  and  the  U.K.  as  well  as  apply 
circumstantial evidence of three EU member countries: Germany, Spain and Italy. The paper attempts to 
analyse if these time series can help in setting policy objectives.
Such a study seems timely as the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank in St.Louis is organising a Symposium on the  
subject of Household Financial Stability Research. The Symposium is to be held in February 2013.
My approach restricts itself to the collective net worth data for individual households and does not deal  
with the distributional aspects of income, consumption and wealth. If collectively households are unable to 
increase their net worth from year to year, it is less fruitful to analyse which group of households suffers 
most. Ultimately all groups suffer through changes in unemployment levels, through losses in values of 
homes and company shares and through government taxation and debt accumulation.
The aim of capitalism is to make people richer rather than poorer. It is supposed to be a better system than  
communism, which, in its purest forms, takes away individual responsibility and replaces it with a central  
planning discipline.
Within the western capitalist  countries  the individual  households  are  at  the core of the economic and 
financial system. They are the drivers of the economy by providing their services to produce output, by 
using their income to consume, pay taxes and to save. Individual households provide all funding to all  
other  households  in  western  societies:  to  a  government,  to  banks,  companies  and  all  other  financial 
intermediaries. All these latter entities manage the funds provided to them on behalf of the individual  
households. The latter entities manage the risks taken with these funds and the individual households hope 
and expect a reward for such risks taken with their monies.
Over  the  years,  managers  of  any  of  these  entities  could  have  and  did  made  mistakes  in  risk  taking 
activities. The most fundamental mistake is to use funds for activities for which there is no or little demand 
resulting in no or low incoming cash flows. This mistake is most common in commercial enterprises. A 
second -equally fundamental- mistake is funding activities for which it is highly unlikely that the fund 
users can repay the borrowings. This mistake is nearly always made by individual banks and such mistakes  
can affect many banks. A third and also a major mistake is for a central bank to take over debts -such as  
government  or mortgage bond debt- and not to pay households a risk premium any longer. The ultimate  
risk  holders  for  such  actions  are  and  will  remain  the  individual  households  collectively.  Under  all 
circumstances they remain liable for all government debt. If they do no longer get paid for holding risks, 
their net worth position will suffer.
The  result  of  all  managers’  activities  is  found  in  the  balance  sheet  of  households  and  non-profit 
organisations: the net worth of individual households. For households this is the “value at risk” amount.
1 http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/accessible/b100.htm
2 http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/annuals/a1995-2004.pdf
3 http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/dcp171778_276513.pdf
4http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/pgp_ess/0_DOCS/estat/TF1_Final_report_Household_Perspective.
pdf
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The most fascinating facts which can be distilled out of these figures are the changes in net worth positions  
from  one  year  to  the  next:  such  changes  represent  the  real  “Country’s  Profit  or  Loss”  levels. 
Simultaneously the return on equity over the net worth amounts can be deducted from these data.
Studying  the U.S.  data,  the  average Country Profit  for  the  period 1995-2007 was US$3.2 trillion per 
annum. The exceptional years were the years 2000-2002, 2007 and especially 2008 where the Country’s 
Loss reached the amazing level of US$12.6 trillion. For the U.K. the average Country Profit level was  
£450 billion per annum between 2002 and 2007. For 2008 the Country’s Loss was £840 billion. Country 
profit developments also constitute an excellent guidance on what will happen to economic growth. 
This paper aims to explain what can be done to prevent Country Loss making activities and which actions 
can be taken to shorten the current crisis period. Preventive measures could include the establishment of an  
Office of a Secretary (or Minister) for Savings, whose role it would be to oversee all managerial activities  
which give rise  to  Country Losses.  Curative measures  could include using existing long-term savings 
sources for enhancing economic growth. 
Over the last five years some surprising facts have occurred. The US stock market index (DJIA) reached a 
level of 14165 in October 2007. In August 2012 it stood at 13107. Collectively companies have not added 
any value to the Country’s Profit over a five year period. Secondly government debt levels have shot up, 
but only some countries have seen a steep increase in long term government bond yields, while others like 
Germany,  the U.K. and the U.S. have seen their long term yields drop below inflation levels.  Thirdly 
property values have not added any value to Country Profits in the U.S., certainly not in Spain and Italy 
and  for  the  U.K.  they  have  stagnated.  Finally  in  all  major  western  countries  -  except  for  Germany-  
unemployment levels have gone up over the last five years. In Spain and Greece where unemployment is 
experienced by a large group of the labour force, such situations represent a failure of the capitalist system.
When individual households can no longer earn their way out of a crisis, serious questions have to be asked 
about the long term viability of the capitalist  system. What is needed is an effective risk management  
system to avoid and correct the pitfalls of making Country Losses.
1. How It All Started
Ever since August 9, 2007 when French bank BNP Paribas told investors that they would not be able to 
take money out of two of its sub-prime mortgage funds because it could not value the assets in them due to 
a “complete evaporation of liquidity”, the financial crisis has overwhelmed governments, banks, pension 
funds and life insurance companies, other companies and last but not least individuals who lost their jobs 
and a substantial share of their asset values. Collectively households got poorer not just in one country, but 
in all the five countries studied, the U.S, the U.K. and Germany, Spain and Italy.
In the U.S. during the few years preceding 2008, mortgage originators started to have mortgages approved 
by banks on basis of doubtful principles. A Deutsche Bank study5 came to the conclusion that 37% of the 
mortgages granted were interest only mortgages; 38% of the mortgages also required no down payment so 
100% of the value of the home was borrowed; 43% of the borrowers were not required to provide any 
proof of income and finally 80% of borrowers were attracted by providing them with a low start up interest 
rate for a period of two years, after which interest rates were hiked steeply.
According to the study, the subprime market segment “only” amounted to U.S$1.2 trillion out of the total  
home mortgage market of U.S$10 trillion.
U.S. investment banks started to package these subprime mortgages into Collateralised Debt Obligations.  
Based on AAA ratings from the U.S. credit rating agencies, the investment banks sold these CDO’s around 
the world, but also to U.S. money market funds. When the real risks to these mortgages appeared, as cash  
flows faltered,  the  U.S investment  banks  were  in  no position  to  maintain  a  market  in  these CDO’s.,  
5 http://www.globalsecuritisation.com/08_gbp/gbp_gssf08_022_031_db_us_subprm.pdf
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something they had promised to do. The CDO’s turned from “going concern” to “liquidation” CDO’s. The 
pricing fell of a cliff and many CDO holders could not get out of the risks. Huge losses on savings were  
made.
The errors in cash flow predictions had a major impact on residential property values in the US.  The S&P/ 
Case Shiller home price index dropped from an index value 170 at the end of 2007 till 1396 a year later. 
Banks, apart from lending to their own clients, also lend to each other, as well as trade in risk products. The 
banks, as well as the financial markets, became uncertain which bank had what type of exposure. Interbank 
lending dried up.  It  led to bank closures and bank rescues especially in the U.S.,  the U.K. and some  
European countries. Credit tightening took place around the world. This led to an overspill into the share 
markets.  The  shares  dropped  on  real  and  perceived  company  and  bank  risks.  The  U.S.  and  other 
governments’ budgets were also affected. They had to borrow substantial funds to bail out banks and to  
compensate for lower tax incomes. The U.S. defined benefit pension schemes saw their asset values drop  
by 30% in 2008 and they alone lost around $1 trillion in the same year.  As companies guarantee the  
pension  benefits  in  DB  schemes  this  led  to  another  unwanted  side  effect,  in  2009  U.S.  companies 
maintaining DB schemes were forced to set aside U.S$90 billion compared to U.S$45 billion in 2008, a  
doubling of contributions in times of recession. The “oil spill” effects of the subprime mortgage debacle 
had serious effects on the long term savers and on the real economies throughout the world through lower  
or  negative  economic  growth  rates  with  higher  unemployment  rates,  bank  lending  restrictions  or 
contractions, a drop in company sales levels and increased government deficit levels. The original loss on 
cash flows from subprime mortgages was multiplied many times over in the financial markets and the real  
economies. In the US alone the net worth of all households dropped by US$12.7 trillion in 2008.7 Compare 
this to the original US$1.2 trillion in subprime mortgages and it becomes obvious how a major cash flow 
prediction error can be multiplied by a factor of more than 10 in net worth losses.
An excellent introduction to the American Financial Crisis can be found in America’s Financial Crisis: The 
End of An Era by Barry Bosworth and Aaron Flaaen8.
2. Capitalism and the Developments in the Net Worth Position
Currently success  in  the  capitalist  model  is  measured  through incomes  (National  Income)  and output  
(Gross Domestic Product), both sides of the same process. Economic growth data -reflecting the changes in 
GDP- are closely monitored. Economic theories are based on supply and demand, market prices and the  
profit motive -risk taking versus rewards-. Individuals are supposed to make rational choices.
The links  between economic  growth,  the  financial  and real  estate  markets  and the individuals  are  all 
measured through the changes in the net worth position of all  households in a country.  The net worth 
position reflects households’ “value at risk” position. It includes share equity holdings, net equity positions 
in homes,  net government bond holdings, net deposits with banks and pension pot holdings. A loss of 
US$12.7 trillion in net worth on an output level of about US$14 trillion in 2008 did not represent a rational  
choice by individual households in the U.S. They did not aim to lose 19.2% of their total savings level in a  
single year,  let  alone 90.7% of GDP value in a single year.  For the U.K. comparable figures9 show a 
similar,  albeit  slightly less disastrous picture. In 2008 total households net worth dropped by UK£841 
billion or 12.4% of total savings, which represented a savings loss to GDP value in that year of 41.3%.
Societies based on the western capitalist model have organised themselves in all kind of businesses units as  
well as having an elected government. These institutions take managerial decisions on behalf of individual  
households. Only 100% family owned companies combine entrepreneurship with wealth creation. All other 
companies -including banks and insurance companies-, as well as pension funds and a government rely 
totally  on  “other  peoples’  money”.  All  their  funding  originates  from individual  households.  It  is  this 
6 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Case-Shiller_index#Historical_values
7 http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1r-5.pdf
8http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2009/4/14%20financial%20crisis
%20bosworth/0414_financial_crisis_bosworth.pdf
9 http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/rel/cap-stock national-balance-sheet/2012-results/stb---national-balance-sheet-2012.html
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structure  of  western  societies  which  lies  at  the  heart  of  the  current  economic  problems.  Individual  
households  have  practically  no  say  over  what  business  managers  -including  government  business  
managers-  decide  to  do  with  the  money  they  have  received  from these  households.   Family  owned 
companies  usually  practice  prudent  risk  management  strategies,  as  they themselves  have  to  carry the 
financial  implications  of  their  own decisions;  for  instance  in  Germany,  but  also in  some  Far  Eastern 
countries, the family owned businesses represent an important share of total output. For other sectors of 
society -again including governments- prudent market behaviour is not an automatism; it is not an inbuilt  
mechanism. The profit drive of companies but also the actions (or inactions) of governments can be at odds  
with the aims of the household sector to see their net worth values grow.  Market abuse -like in the case of 
the US subprime mortgage crisis and also in the case of Spain where 800 000 residential properties were 
built  for which there were no buyers and funded by some local banks- was possible as there were no 
countervailing powers to stem such abuse. The checks and balances needed to run a “profitable” country, a 
country whereby output growth adds to net worth growth for individual households were and are not in 
place. The western capitalist model is under serious threat if it cannot correct its weaknesses. 
Current  discussions about  changing the modus operandi  of the operations of the western model  focus 
widely on changing the gearing ratios for banks, insurance companies and pension funds. They also focus 
on past abuses such as Libor fixing and PPI (payment protection insurance). Such focus totally misses the 
point  that  both  equity  and  debt  represent  savings  provided  by  individual  households;  it  is  the  latter 
households’ “value at risk”. Changing the ratios between equity and debt for banks, insurance companies  
and pension funds does neither improve the quality of risk taking nor the potential level of “profits” or 
“losses” to individual households. In the case of Libor fixing, this was a people related activity, including a 
lack of oversight by government authorities at the time. If an example has to be set, than the people rather  
than the capital base of the organisations involved, should be brought to justice. 
Risk taking is at the heart of the capitalist model and of course some risks will turn out to be less well  
judged than others. However when collective risk taking does not lead to increases in net worth for all  
households  together,  it  means  that  output  production  has  been  hampered  by  poor  risk  management 
decisions. Such poor decisions include taking or taking over risks for which the risk takers -the individual 
households- are not rewarded. In all these cases the financial assets provided by all individual households 
have not been used to the benefit of such households. It is interesting to mention that in the U.K. in the  
period from 2002 till 2007 the net worth increase was between £400 and £500 billion annually.  It showed 
a  steady  increase.  The  country  operated  profitably  during  these  years.  Simultaneously  the  economy 
continued to grow. In 2008 the total net worth dropped by 12.4%, it gained about £600 billion back in 2009 
and another £460 billion back in 2010, but totally stagnated in 2011 at the 2010 level. The expectations for 
2012 for the U.K. are not much better as economic growth is expected to be stagnant this year. The 2011 
net worth level is only just above the 2007 level, the difference being:  £250 billion. This was measured on 
a nominal basis and not on a real value after adjusting for inflation levels.
The U.S. shows a somewhat similar picture. In 2006 its households net worth increased by US$4.4 trillion  
as compared to the previous year. However in 2007 some major changes occurred. Households’ dwelling 
values dropped by $1.87 trillion while home mortgages increased by $674 billion, a combined change of  
values of $2.54 trillion. If the value change and the increased level of home mortgages had not occurred in  
2007 than the households net worth would have been up by slightly over $3 trillion.
3. Factors Determining “Country Profit”
The annual increase or decrease in the net worth of all individual households can be described as a true  
reflection of the profit or loss levels for a country in a particular year: the Country’s Profit or Loss level. In  
appendix 2 the country profit levels for the U.S have been calculated for the years 1996-2011. Similar  
figures for the U.K. have been included from 2002. Also the return on equity for all individual households 
has been calculated reflecting the increase in net worth in a current year divided by the average net worth  
position during the year.
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In the cases of the U.S and the U.K., if one compares Individual Households return on equity (IHRoE) with  
economic  growth  rates,  the  IHRoE  appears  to  present  itself  as  a  lead  indicator  for  higher  or  lower 
economic growth levels. 
Four factors will be analysed which can help explain why IHRoE and economic growth rates are so closely 
linked. They are:
• Risk taking and risk spreading transfers;
• Illiquid assets;
• Current incomes and existing debt obligations
• Risk avoidance by individual households.
3.1 Risk Taking and Risk Spreading Transfers
Generally individual households, when buying a home, take a direct risk on their future income flows. For 
all other accumulated savings such risk exposure is totally indirect. Even if the portfolio of financial assets  
has been chosen by the individual,  the moment  the savings are handed over,  all  managerial  decisions  
affecting the value at risk for individual households are taken by companies, banks, pension funds and life  
insurance companies  and a  government.  Spreading of  risks  is  further  enhanced by using mutual  fund 
managers, pension fund managers, insurance companies, venture capital companies, private bankers and all 
others who provide specialist risk management services. What has been striking over the last some thirty 
years  is  how  the  derivative  markets  have  blossomed,  with  credit,  currency  and  commodity  linked 
derivatives facilitating risk transfers from one group of risk takers to another group.  Some multinational 
companies  have  set  up  their  own bank  in  order  to  arrange  cash  and  risk  management  for  all  group 
companies. Risk transfers have also been stimulated by the invention of securitisation of risks and the use 
of Collateralised Debt Obligations, which were extensively used in the sub-prime mortgage securitisation 
process. Quantitative easing constitutes another instrument of risk transfers.
On top of all this, financial markets have developed products such as share lending, contracts for difference  
and other products which do not require 100% savings for speculating on the outcome of the underlying 
risks.
The balance sheet of households of the U.S indicates that it is not the financial assets which have grown 
out of proportion to total assets. In 1995 the financial assets represented 65.5% of total household assets. In 
2007 this ratio stood at 64.9%. The U.K. shows a similar picture. In 2002 the financial assets as part of  
total assets of households stood at 49.4% and in 2011 the ratio was 49.9%.
What has gone wrong in risk taking is that some parties can make profits out of individual household’s  
losses. The salesmen, involved in selling poor quality sub prime mortgage products, generated incomes for  
them as did the investment banks and the credit rating agencies. When the losses appeared, most of the  
risks had been sold on to third parties, who themselves, unwisely in hindsight, relied on the favourable 
credit opinion of the credit rating agencies. The capitalist system has no means, as yet, to hold the product  
originators to account, in case their risk judgment harms country profit levels in a major way.
It is not only businesses which may harm Country Profit making. Governments and central banks can do so  
also. What harms Country Profit making is for a government or central bank to provide guarantees or buy 
up  risks  at  0% interest  costs,  without  providing  the  risk  underwriters  -the  individual  households,  the  
taxpayers-  with  a  reward  for  the  risks  being  taken.  Such  risks  are  embedded  in  quantitative  easing 
practises, in private finance initiatives and in unfunded future government liabilities like unfunded civil 
servants pensions obligations. In privately owned businesses no risk is entered into without a (potential) 
reward. In order for Country Profit creation to work properly, governments should follow the private sector 
example and pay for such risks directly to the ultimate risk providers, the individual households. In times  
of recession it is essential that such payments are made in the current year to add to incomes, rather than  
postpone payments. Otherwise they undermine a critical aspect of the capitalist system.
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Risk judgments should come with responsibilities. What could be done in this respect will be discussed in 
Section 4.
3.2 Illiquid Assets
If one studies the set up of the elements which make up the net worth of individuals, it is striking that a 
very large proportion of it is constituted by illiquid assets. Illiquid assets can be defined as asset classes  
which cannot be turned into cash in a short period of time. In an article called: “The Savings Paradox or  
Managing Financial, Economic or Fiscal Risks”10, I drew attention to the fact that homes, company shares 
and government bonds are the three main asset classes for which individual liquidity i.e. the ability to buy 
or sell one’s home, a share or a government bond is dissimilar to collective liquidity. For instance in the 
case of homes, collective liquidity would mean that either all mortgagees would be asked to repay their  
mortgage loans instantly -an impossible request- or all owners would wish to swap houses into cash all at  
the same time and simultaneously buy another property, again another impossible scenario. What the real 
estate market prices really reflect is the marginal demand and supply. This is also the case for company 
shares and for government bonds. Additional marginal demand for homes can be created by lower interest 
rates for home loans, but only if higher household incomes are generated to make additional mortgage  
lending a viable proposition. In other words such demand is easier to accommodate with higher economic  
growth rates and higher country profit levels. The household net worth computations clearly show that in  
the U.S.  since the start  of  the recent  recession since 2007,  collectively households have reduced their 
exposure  to  home  loans  in  real  as  well  as  in  nominal  terms.  A substantial  loss  in  net  worth  makes 
increasing the level of home mortgages a less bankable proposition for many households. On the other 
hand over aggressive selling techniques for mortgages -based on doubtful lending principles- will lead to  
an excessive marginal supply as foreclosure levels will increase dramatically as they have done since 2007.  
This leads to a steep drop in market values and in country profit, an unwanted situation and undesirable  
economic event as the 2008 country loss figures testify.
The 2000-2002 drop in  economic growth was caused by company shares  sharply dropping in values, 
effecting country profit  levels.  In  2008 both home  values  and share  and mutual  fund values  dropped 
together.
A few remarks should be made about government bonds. From a savers point of view, the government  
bond markets of some countries like Germany, the U.K. and the U.S appear to be the most liquid in the 
world; one can always find a buyer. Collective liquidity focuses on the other side of the obligation: the 
possibility of an immediate transfer into cash of such assets. Of course taxpayers could not possibly raise 
the cash to repay all outstanding government debt at once. Collectively this type of asset is illiquid, just as  
much as real estate and company shares. Why is this distinction important? When markets assess that some 
doubts creep in about a particular country, their funding of government debt creates an upward pressure on 
yields. Ireland, Portugal, Greece and more recently Spain and Italy have experienced such pressure. Such 
pressure stems from collective liquidity concerns. In section 3.4 attention is drawn to the other side of such 
concerns: the capital flight to “safe” government bond markets.
3.3 Current Incomes and Existing Debt Obligations
What both the U.S. and U.K. data show is that when current incomes come under pressure, individual  
households give priority to safeguarding their principal asset: the home from being repossessed by lenders.  
This means that in a period of reduced Country Profits or even Country Losses (slow economic growth or  
recession periods) households reduce other spending in order to reduce debt obligations, especially those 
linked with the homes. In the U.S. since 2007 -instead of increasing home mortgages by some U.S.$800 
billion to U.S.$1 trillion per annum as was average before 2007- the outstanding debt has fallen by about 
U.S$800  billion  over  the  period  2007  till  the  first  quarter  2012.  Secondly  the  home  values  showed 
consistent growth from 1995 until 2006, initially for the first three years growing by some $400 billion 
annually till end 1997. The second period to 2002 the growth accelerated to $1 trillion and slightly above.  
From 2003 till 2005 included, it grew by $1.6 trillion and it reached its growth peak in 2005 with a growth  
10 http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/40146/
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of about $3 trillion. In 2006 the speed of growth dropped off to $700 billion. Ever since 2006 the home 
values have been dropping by in total $6.3 trillion (or 28% of 2006 values) till the end of 2011.
In the U.K. the value of the housing stock reached its peak in 2007 at £4,077 billion, growing annually 
since 2002 by about £300 billion. Even at the end of 2011 was the value at £4,064 billion slightly less than 
2007 values. These are nominal value data, not taking into account that U.K. inflation levels increased 
from 2.6% in 2007 till 3.9% in 2011. The annual increase in home loans during the period 2002-2007 was  
between £90 and £130 billion per year. In 2008 the loan base still grew with £ 50 billion, with zero growth 
thereafter.
When current incomes do not grow or grow less rapidly and when country profit levels decelerate or turn  
into actual losses, experience -as evidenced by the data above- show that households aim to restore their  
own  balance  sheets  by reducing  debt  levels  first  and  spending less  on  purchasing  current  goods  and 
services. Economic growth levels suffer as a consequence.
3.4 Risk Avoidance by Individual Households
Individual households have one choice which none of the risk managers can avoid to obey. They can move 
their savings into what they regard as the safest government bonds in the world. The amazing fact is that it  
has little to do neither with the absolute level of government debt, nor with the government debt to GDP 
ratio. One can put it in figures to see how the world has changed since 2007. Trading economics11 has 
calculated the average 10 year implied government bond yield for the five countries studied. They are for  
the U.S. 6.5% for the period 1912-2012, for the U.K. 6.0% for the period 1989-2012, for Germany 5.1% 
for the period 1989-2012, for Spain 5.7% for the period 1993-2012 and for Italy 5.9% for the period 1993- 
2012. The actual government debt to GDP levels are respectively: for the U.S. 103%, for the U.K. 85.7%,  
for Germany 81.2%, for Spain 68.5% and for Italy 120.1%.  Now the current 10 year yield as per end of  
August 2012 was, for the U.S 1.63%, for the U.K.1.49%, for Germany 1.34%, for Spain 6.48% and for  
Italy 5.82%. 
What  these  figures  illustrate  is  what  companies  practice  and  what  individuals  also  do:  Move  money 
(savings) to places  regarded as the safest  places  for not  loosing the principal  value of the savings or  
earnings.  This  precautionary  savings  motive  is  neither  guided  by  yield,  nor  by  outstanding  level  of  
government debt compared to GDP, but purely by the wish to protect the principal amount of savings. The 
fact that such risk protection costs money in real terms, after taking the inflation levels into account, has  
been no deterrent to invest in government bonds in the U.S., the U.K. and Germany.  From a country profit 
point of view for all five countries, this is the worst possible outcome. There are three reasons for this: (1) 
Government debt can be described as a huge consumer loan, whereby government expenditure in past  
years was not funded by tax incomes in the same year. Consumer debt has the lowest multiplier effect of  
all three asset classes. (2) Funding companies and banks helps create economic growth in the current and 
future years and so does (3) Investing in homes, which creates jobs and also helps economic growth to  
flourish, provided that mortgage loans are granted on a prudent basis.
Consumer  loans -whether  entered into by an individual  household or  by the collective of  households 
through government spending above income levels-, need to be serviced out future incomes. When a larger 
and  larger  proportion  of  income  and  savings  is  used  for  servicing  consumer  loans  rather  than  for 
“investment funding”, the whole economy becomes less efficient, hence less country profit. This is why 
fiscal discipline is a must. What is less important is the actual level of government expenditure as long as it 
is matched by income transfers in the current year. However one should stress that economic efficiency is  
just as much a must for government households as it is for the private sector. 
The unwanted side effect of individual households as well as companies and banks moving cash to the so-
called safe haven economies is that government bond yields in the U.S., the U.K., and Germany are now 
far below average long term yields of the past and even below inflation levels. This hinders Country Profit  
11 http://www.tradingeconomics.com/bonds-list-by-country
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making.  The rewards no longer compensate for inflation levels.  Households get poorer.  The increased 
levels of government debt since 2007 were mostly unavoidable as banks had to be rescued in order to 
prevent an even more calamitous loss in country profit levels. However, paying interest rates on a long  
term basis at below inflation levels, harms pension funds and all other savers, who want to build up a nest  
egg for the life time cycle of work and retirement. When the other asset classes -shares and homes- do not  
perform well,  it  is a government’s  prerogative to ensure that their “consumer loans” provide the bond  
holders with a reasonable reward over inflation. Past long term rates did not deter economic growth to 
happen. Paying higher rates, especially to pension funds in a country can be arranged as will be explained  
in section 4.2.2 on economic easing.
The  governments  of  the  U.S.  and  the  U.K.  have  taken  it  upon  themselves  to  lower  the  long  term 
government bond yields through a series of bond purchases by their respective central banks. Such actions 
are called: quantitative easing. In the U.K. £375 billion out of a total government debt level of around £1 
trillion has been bought up by the Bank of England. Regretfully neither the U.K. share market nor the 
mortgage market  or  the home values seem to have been positively effected as the net  worth data for  
individual households clearly demonstrates. By the Bank’s own admission it has created the inflation level  
to rise with 1%, which put pressure on households to maintain the same volume of consumption. Economic  
growth did suffer, especially if one considers that households wanted to restore their own balance sheets by 
paying  of  debt  rather  than  increase  consumption.  Such  quantitative  easing  policies  are  based  on  a 
misunderstanding of what  helps to create Country Profit.  The misunderstanding is  that  Central Banks, 
which practice quantitative easing, acquire risks for which they offer no return. The individual households, 
which provide the value at risk amounts, remain the ultimate risk holders, but they see no financial return 
any longer over their risks. Country Profit making is undermined. The ECB is considering a similar scheme 
of quantitative easing by its insistence to buy up short term Spanish government bonds. Again this is based 
on taking up risks, which ultimately have to be serviced by the individual households in the Eurozone 
countries, without paying a risk premium to the risk takers as Central Banks can print money at 0% costs. 
In  section  4.3.3.,  an alternative solution is  provided,  whereby the  individual  households  of  the  seven 
countries: Austria,  Germany,  Belgium,  the Netherlands, Luxembourg,  France and Finland can take the 
risks on taxpayers in other Eurozone countries. The first group, via their governments, attract real savings 
out of the financial markets, deposit these savings with the ECB and enable the ECB to buy up some long 
term bonds from countries like Spain and Italy.  The risk-reward ratio is that the risk underwriters: the 
individual households in the seven Eurozone countries gain the benefit of Spain’s and Italy’s higher 10 
year bond yields over their own cost of funds: a Country Profit increase, while simultaneously the long 
term yields in Spain and Italy come down. Once the financial markets know that this intervention will be 
repeated  till  the  latter  two  countries  pay  around  2%  over  inflation,  they  themselves  rather  than  the 
taxpayers  will  want  to  take  up  such  risks,  making  further  intervention  unnecessary.  The  individual  
households in the seven countries should be rewarded for underwriting these risks. They should see a cash 
pay out of the profits made by the ECB over this funding and lending exercise. Such risk taking-reward  
exercise increases Country Profit levels in the seven countries. It also eliminates the capital flight to safety  
which takes away “values at risks” from one country, only to lower Country Profit levels in all countries.
4. Country Profit Levels and Collective Risk Management 
4.1 Introduction
2008 will stand out in economic history as the year that the U.S. lost about four times its average Country 
Profit of previous years in a single year. The impact on the balance sheets of individual households was 
huge. Their reply was -as evidenced by the data provided in the Balance Sheet of Households and Non-
Profit Organisations- to protect the home from being confiscated by lenders. This was done by collectively 
reducing outstanding home mortgages. As home values kept dropping at the same time, the owners’ equity 
as a percentage of household real estate dropped from 56.6% in 2006 till 40.7% currently. The latter is a  
slight improvement over the level of 38.8% which was reached as recently as the fourth quarter of 2011. 
Such households’ actions have two effects. The first one is that when incomes are spent on reducing debt 
levels,  less  remains  available  for  spending on current  consumption,  so economic  growth  suffers.  The 
second effect is that the dynamic effect of increasing mortgage loans together with increasing home values 
10
When Capitalism No Longer Works - A Profit Warning © Drs Kees de Koning
has been taken out of the economic equation. Loans and home values have to move in tandem in order to 
increase Country Profit. A major economic growth element has been sterilised by the, very understandable, 
households’ actions.
The collective preference by households to use incomes to repay mortgage debts in priority over spending 
on consumer goods has a major effect on demand levels in a society. On top of this, during the period since 
2007  the  growth  element  of  simultaneous  growth  in  loans  and  home  values  was  also  eliminated. 
Consequently corporate equities did suffer. 
In the U.K. households are also paying off their consumer debt. In July 2012 they paid back the net amount 
of £147 million. This represented the biggest drop since August 2006. Again households are repairing their 
balance sheets, in a way which harms demand in the U.K. economy and thereby Country Profit making. 
Corporate equity values show a much greater volatility than home prices. For instance the 1999 corporate 
equity values in the U.S. of U.S$9.763 trillion have not been reached up till to-day. The volatility is a 
consequence  of  the  difficulty  in  predicting  corporate  cash  flows  in  uncertain  times.  Optimism  and  
pessimism change the outlook on a daily basis.
 
Apart from homes and shares, individual households can also change their asset allocation between the 
three asset classes. This element is of particular importance in the Eurozone countries, more than for the 
United States. If doubts arise about the collective liquidity of homes or shares, individual households will  
aim to protect the principal sum of their savings, by moving such funds to the perceived “safest countries” 
and into  the  safest  asset  class:  government  bonds.  The U.S.,  the  U.K.  and Germany and some  other  
Northern European countries have been on the receiving end of such cash movements. Others like Ireland, 
Portugal, and Greece and more recently Spain and Italy have seen the negative effects of such movements.  
These decisions are not only taken by individual households directly, but also by the managers of their 
funds, like companies, banks and portfolio managers. This drive to “safety” harms Country Profit making  
as it takes savings out of one community to another and places it into the least productive asset class:  
government bonds.
The conclusion to be drawn from the above is that prevention is highly preferable over correction, as the  
correction period has now lasted five years and most economies are still in a worse shape than they were in 
2007. However as preventive measures were not taken in the past, corrective measures need to come first 
at  this  stage.  From a Country Profit  perspective the most  important  element  is  to speed up economic  
growth levels, not just in the U.S. but in all European countries as well. This can only be achieved by a  
demand  driven  initiative  as  supply driven  measures  rely on  growing net  worth  levels.  In  section  4.2 
possible initiatives to increase demand levels will be set out. In section 4.3 possible preventive measures  
will be explored.
4.2 Corrective Measures
4.2.1. Introduction
The traditional method to stimulate economic growth was the Keynesian method of incurring additional 
government  debt  to increase government  spending in a current  year.  There are three reasons why the  
Keynesian  practice  has  probably  outlived  its  usefulness.  The  first  one  is  that  from a  Country  Profit  
perspective, government debt is the least productive of the three asset classes, the more productive ones 
being homes and corporate equities. Once the borrowed money has been spent by a government, there is  
usually no direct cash flow to earn back the borrowed money.  The multiplier effect has to come from  
indirect earnings via the increased output by the private sector and increased earnings by the working 
population. The second one is that starting up and stopping additional government expenditure seems a 
difficult process for most governments. It is much easier -also for the electorate- to accept the additional  
spending rather than the pay-back process of additional  taxes.  Last  but  not  least  the current  levels of  
government  debt  for  the  U.S.,  the  U.K.  and  most  European  countries,  coupled  with  the  reduced 
government tax levels in a recession period make it almost impossible to sensibly spend one’s way out of  
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recession by prime pumping. Individual households will reward the prudent countries over the profligate  
spenders.
The second method, based on Friedman and Schwartz’ study of the Great Depression of the 1930’s, was  
the monetarist  approach to economic growth.  They claimed that  the supply of money in the economy 
determines economic growth and the rate of inflation, which was most likely correct in the circumstances 
of the Great Depression. Their policy recommendations, still followed to-day by some Central Banks, is to  
flood the market with liquidity and follow a low interest rate policy.
The principal weaknesses in the monetarist arguments are three fold: Firstly the Country Loss in 2008 was 
caused by funding a loan portfolio for debtors who were in no income position to repay and service their 
debts -the subprime mortgage crisis-. The cause of the crisis was a risk misjudgement by banks on a large  
scale. It  caused an income and a value crisis for individual households, whereby the decreasing home 
values started to have a multiplier effect on incomes. As the evidence provided by the net worth data 
testifies both in the U.S. and the U.K., the reaction by the collective of households was to start repaying  
mortgage debt rather than increasing home loans. No supply of liquidity through the banking system can 
change such reaction. 
The second weakness is in the type of business which makes the error of judgment. If companies make an 
error  of  judgment  in  over  estimating  demand  for  their  products,  the  ultimate  penalty  is  closure  of  a 
company. Often however such closure can be avoided as cash flow errors show up quickly. However if  
banks make an error, such errors take longer to work their way through the system and the risks are also  
multiplied by affecting other banks or the whole banking sector. Mortgage lending and providing consumer 
credits are practised by nearly all banks in the world. Banks base their credit judgments on future incomes 
and values. If incomes and values fall simultaneously,  as they did in 2008, than the collective banking 
sector needs to retrench, notwithstanding having liquidity provided and low interest rates maintained. Such 
a  crisis  is  a  collective  solvency  crisis  and  is  based  on  the  income  and  value  losses  all  households  
experience  collectively  through  Country  Losses.  Financial  misjudgement  errors  have  a  much  greater 
impact than corporate errors. They have a much higher multiplier effect. 
Finally the third weakness lies in the low interest rate policy. What is good for borrowers is not necessarily 
good for the fund providers: the individual households. In the past sound levels of economic growth have 
been happening when long term government bond rates were at or over 5% per annum. It is an extremely 
doubtful argument to state that a long term interest level below the inflation rate is a sound policy for 
creating  Country  Profit.  Individual  households  have  no  choice  but  to  leave  their  value  at  risk  in  an 
economy.  There  is  no  way  they  can  turn  assets  into  cash  without  harming  Country  Profit  making.  
Governments have a choice: either to support Country Profit making or slowing down economic growth 
with negative real long term interest rates. 
In the next section Economic Easing is discussed. This method avoids the pitfalls of both the Keynesian 
and the Monetarist approach.
4.2.2 The Economic Easing Method
Individual households in the U.S., the U.K, the Netherlands and Canada have build up large pension fund 
reserves in order to pay for future incomes. These reserves have been accumulated via the contributions of  
individuals and sometimes companies or even governments on their behalf. The second element consists of 
investment returns. In a way pension funds, in their investment returns, closely resemble the country profit  
levels in a country. Pension funds usually have no gearing; they consist of pure savings allocated over the 
asset classes. Their accumulation and distribution pattern of savings is closely monitored by the countries  
concerned.  Much debate is  going on about  the  manner  of measuring,  predicting and allocating future  
investment results over the different age groups as longevity plays a major role in the changes. What, so 
far, has not been discussed is how pension funds can contribute to economic growth. The principal concept 
is to link savings directly with consumer spending in the current period. The current size of pension funds 
in the U.S., the U.K., the Netherlands and Canada make such a link possible. In all these countries the 
accumulated fund levels now exceed or closely resemble the annual GDP level. In my background paper to 
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the Tenth Annual Conference on Pensions, Retirement Security and Strategies for Investment Conference 
organised by Harvard Law School (March 28-30 2012), I suggested to use “economic easing” as a method  
to stimulate economic growth.
Economic easing can be defined as the action of turning a small part of savings accumulated for future 
expenditure -the pension savings- into current consumption. 
Take the U.S. case as an example. If 2% of pension savings were distributed in 2013, this would mean that 
$280 billion extra  consumer  demand  would be created,  provided all  beneficiaries  spend their  pension 
dividend on consumer goods, something they should be encouraged to do. If, assuming again, that markets  
know that such action would be repeated in later years until economic growth reaches its optimal growth 
path, than such certainty will make companies wanting to invest their cash reserves or obtain additional  
bank or capital markets funding. Jobs will be created. Production levels will be increased. Company profits  
will  increase,  hence share prices will  improve.  Country profit  levels will  start  to improve.  Finally the 
government will benefit from higher tax incomes. The positive multiplier effect will start to work.
Of course the temporary cash injection in to the U.S. economy out of pension reserves can not be done 
without a compensation for the pension funds. Such compensation will need a change in the tax laws. Until  
now the U.S. and other governments have always practised that taxes pay for government expenditure. To 
make economic easing a success requires a change in tax philosophy. Individual households provide all the 
funding  for  all  business  units,  including  a  government,  in  the  U.S.  and  in  other  countries.  When  an 
economy is stimulated in above described manner all households in a country benefit. It would therefore be 
appropriate that when the benefits are shared, also the costs of it are shared. This implies that a small  
portion of future tax receipts is set aside for returning the savings back to the pension funds. The boost for 
the economy in 2013 would not be provided by the government -a Keynesian cash injection- but directly 
from individual households’ savings to individual households’ spending -economic easing-. Government 
debt does not increase, but a small share of future incomes need to be returned into savings, which only a 
government can do through its tax collection. The savings into cash and back into savings cycle constitute  
a taxpayers’ obligation as all taxpayers were beneficiaries of the economic boost in the first place.
The practical implications for implementing an economic easing policy are as follows:
- Step 1: The Government aims to reach an agreement with all pension funds (DB as well as DC schemes)  
so that the latter can pay say 2% of their value to all pension savers and retirees. The values could be fixed  
as of 30th December 2012.
-  Step 2: Once an in principle agreement has been reached, such pay out (a pension dividend) could be 
made available in four equal quarterly instalments of 0.5% of the value, starting as soon as administrative 
hurdles have been overcome.
- Step 3: The pay out could be for an equal amount per pension saver and retiree. This would benefit the 
younger and the less well off more than those closer to retirement date and those with the larger pension 
pots. However the younger participants have the longest period of contributions and investment risks ahead 
of them.
- Step 4: As the aim of this measure is to stimulate economic growth; the government might agree to have  
the pension dividend paid out tax free.
- Step 5: If pension funds are short of cash, they could be allowed to borrow these amounts from the 
Central Bank in their respective country, until pension contributions and dividend and interest flows have 
come in.
- Step 6: As a logical extension of economic easing, which is done to create more Country Profit for all  
households, a government could agree that the pension savings used for current consumption will be repaid  
by the taxpayers.
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- Step 7: The logical conclusion could be that such repayments take place as and when economic growth  
rates have reached the desired level, in other words when Country Profit levels have reached their long 
term average.
- Step 8: The rewards for pension funds in participating in such a scheme could be a taxpayer’s guarantee,  
based on an inflation level plus 2% remuneration per annum for the pension funds. The indirect rewards for 
pension  funds  are  more  substantial  as  the  increased  level  of  demand  in  the  company  sector  will  be  
translated in higher share prices. Banks will experience less loan losses. The government will also benefit  
indirectly by higher tax incomes. The maturity of the economic easing facility should be determined by the 
pension funds and the government jointly based on actual country profit developments.
- Step 9: As the repayment obligation is not linked with the repayment of past government expenditure,  
economic easing does not influence government debt levels. It is in effect a scheme to bring forward the 
use of a small part of the savings and have such savings replaced by all taxpayers as and when Country 
Profit levels start to rise.
- Step 10: Finally the beneficiaries of the pension dividend should be convinced that the amounts are for 
consumption purposes rather than for adding to the savings level.
The economic easing method can be started up and stopped very easily.  It can also be maintained for  
longer  than  a  year,  if  needed.  Both  groups  of  taxpayers  and  pension  pot  savers  and retirees  are  the  
inhabitants of a particular country, they constitute the individual households and the managers of all the  
savings made by the households. A potential positive side effect of economic easing is that it will stimulate 
individual households to participate in funded pension scheme savings as only pension savers and retirees 
will  receive a reward for savings.  Such participation will  reduce the pressure on future  government’s  
budgets to provide for the basic state pension.
Economic easing can be implemented in the countries with a substantial funded pension system. In the 
cases of Spain and Italy, for instance, these countries have not built up such pension reserves. However, in 
order to shorten the worldwide economic crisis period, the economies of these countries could also be 
stimulated.
The European Financial Stability Fund is the ideal vehicle for replacing the role of the pension funds for 
Spain and Italy and potentially for some of the other Eurozone countries as well. Spain, for instance would  
need around Euro30 billion in the first year of easing. The guaranteeing nations for the EFSF funding 
would need to accept that the repayment obligations come from Spain’s taxpayers and is not a government  
debt  obligation.  They  would  also  need  to  accept  that  repayment  obligations  should  follow  the 
developments  of  Country  Profit  developments  for  Spain.  Therefore  the  facility’s  repayment  schedule 
should be agreed between the EFSF and the country once Country Profit levels have improved.
4.2.3 The Case of Spain
Apart from economic growth Spain needs a solution to its overhang of 800 000 unsold homes. By solving 
this problem the banking problem will be much less acute. A possible solution is described below.
In Spain, the cause of its current crisis has very little to do with the Euro as a currency or with the Spanish  
government acting imprudently, but all to do with some banks turning savings into 800 000 homes which 
could not be sold to potential buyers. What other European governments might have done to help manage 
these collective risks from spreading to the Spanish economy and Spanish government is set up a second 
home  acquisition  scheme  for  their  own  nationals  rather  than  lend  Euro100  billion  to  the  Spanish 
government, or directly to the Spanish banks. The latter injection equates to Euro125 000 for each unsold 
home. The unsold home problem could have been solved much more effectively by supporting foreigners  
in buying homes in Spain from the Spanish banks or population. This could be done with the help of a 
subsidy. Instead of providing Euro125 000 per home, give foreigners a subsidy of 20% of the amount i.e.  
Euro25 000 per home. If the lending is also executed by German, British, French, Dutch, Swiss, Austrian 
and Scandinavian banks than the inward capital movement into Spain will help solve the real estate crisis,  
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part of the banking crisis and a substantial part of the government debt crisis. The homes should be of a 
minimal value of Euro150 000, which equates to properties of 120 sq meters in the Spanish Mediterranean  
Coastal  provinces.  Such potential  buyers  should themselves  put  in  an amount  minimally  equal  to  the 
governments’ injection. The remainder amount should be up to the foreign bank’s credit judgment. The 
buyers should also agree not to sell the properties for a minimum of five years.  The Bank of Spain could 
supervise the scheme. Of course the scheme would be stopped as and when the supply of homes comes 
nearer to the full utilisation levels.
The consequences: The Spanish property markets will turn around pretty quickly; a place in the sun is still  
a dream for many Northern Europeans. The Spanish banks will be relieved from their property overhang 
on which no cash flow is received while their borrowings still carry interest costs. The Spanish people who 
sell and move to other properties will usually have more cash available as 50% of homes are owned in  
Spain without a mortgage.  European governments  usually operate either capital gains taxes or income 
taxes on second properties, so they will get their money back in due course. Last but not least the capital 
inflows into Spain and the strengthening of the banking sector plus the additional tourist incomes will help 
the Spanish economy to turn around as well. This comes all at a fraction of the costs of the Euro100 billion. 
Spanish government bond yields will come down as well. The example is just one of the ways in which 
understanding the causes of the risks to savers can help devise sound solutions.  The “perceived risk”  
outlook for Spain will fundamentally change by implementing this scheme.
4.3 Preventative Measures
4.3.1 Introduction
The financial, economic and fiscal crises of 2007-2008 started because some business entities were loading 
up risks on society, which the obligors could not repay. As such repayments involved the housing sector, 
the  latter  sector  lost  substantial  values.  There  are  two  sides  to  any  lending-borrowing  relationship.  
However risk management clearly is the responsibility of the lenders. The lenders failed in their duty of  
prudence. Not only did they fail, they also failed in their duties by selling such risks around the world.  
Most of the lenders did not suffer personally as they got their rewards and cashed out early and went off to  
do other things. If the lenders and the facilitators of the risk transfer had been obliged to guarantee the risks 
they sold, the volume of risks transferred would not have gotten out of hand to the degree it did.
4.3.2 A Minister for Savings?
 
What it all means is that economic risk management i.e. Country Profit risk management, deserves a CEO,  
a Minister (or Secretary) for Savings. The Minister should be independent from Government, but of course  
not independent from parliament. His responsibilities would be to oversee that risk originators, be they 
banks, companies, but also the government, in its expenditure for infrastructure and capital goods projects 
and for taking up or taking over financial risks, follow prudent risk management practices. The Minister  
would not replace existing regulators for banks, companies and pension fund supervision. However his role 
would be to asses whether certain collective practices, which may not be illegal, would harm Country 
Profit making. The emphasis is on risk management assessment and economic efficiency. The role of the 
Savings Minister is different from a Minister for Finance, the latter’s role is to establish the government’s 
budget and collect the required tax payments. The role of the Savings Minister is also different from a  
Governor of a central bank. The latter is in charge of the monetary policy initiatives and is not in charge of 
all elements which contribute to Country Profit. Prevention of risk taking excesses is a worthwhile cause to 
have a senior person committed to it.
Other  elements  of  risk  taking  occur  in  underwriting  share  issues.  Here  the  question  is  should  the  
underwriters be committed to guarantee their risk judgment for longer than the day of placement of the 
shares: for instance over a year or longer period with declining responsibilities; again not a legal judgment 
but a risk judgment.
Another  risk  element  occurs  in  Mergers  and  Acquisitions.  Again  the  same  question  as  above  needs 
answering.
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4.3.3 Eurozone Government Bond Risk Management
The 17 Eurozone countries share one currency, but each country has a different inflation rate, a different  
rate of economic growth, a different level of unemployment, a different level of outstanding government  
debt and a different state of its banking sectors. Taxation levels differ and so do the savings levels for  
pension provisions. Managing the gap risks between short and long term savings intentions needs positive 
government actions, not necessarily at European Union level, but collectively at individual country level.
This  could  be  done  as  follows:  Countries  such  as  Austria,  Germany,  Belgium,  the  Netherlands, 
Luxembourg,  France  and  Finland  could  attract  10  year  funds  from  the  financial  markets  not  for 
government spending but for financial risk management purposes by depositing these funds as reserves at 
the ECB.  As an example, Germany could use these powers until its borrowing yield reaches 3.9%, 2% 
over its current inflation level. These savings remain German savings at the ECB. For the other six funding 
countries their  inflation rate plus 2% would also be the yard  stick.  The ECB could with these funds,  
subsequently buy up long term government debt of the 10 countries, provided that they follow the fiscal  
pact. In these 10 countries the yield has overshot the level of inflation plus 2%. In the case of Spain, which 
always had a very prudent central government, its inflation rate is, like Germany’s, 1.9%, but its yield is 
6.48%%. In this example the ECB would buy 10 year Spanish bonds currently at 6.48% and subsequently 
at lower yields till the Spanish yield also stands at 3.9%. 
The ECB’s interest income from Spanish bonds exceeds the borrowing costs of the seven countries. Such 
interest income will be fully distributed over the funders pro rata of their funding contributions. In this way 
the costs of  issuing more government  debt  than needed for own government expenditure of the seven 
countries is more than met by the income from bonds of the 10 countries held by the ECB. Governments of 
the seven countries could ensure that the Profit made out of the funding and loan transaction by the ECB is  
returned to individual  households.  Individual  households  will  see that  the  cross country risk taking is 
rewarded with a pay out. At the same time fiscal prudence stays intact. The action is aimed at maintaining 
financial  stability  across  the  Eurozone,  rather  than  increasing  government  expenditure  levels  in  any 
participating Eurozone country. The interest costs will be met by the real borrowers, the 10 nations. The  
fund suppliers –the seven nations- get an extra income, while the taxpayers in the 10 countries benefit from 
the balancing act of the ECB. The ECB’s mandate may need to be adjusted for executing this type of 
financial transaction. The great advantage is that the ECB does not need to rely on money printing, but can 
rely on moving real private savings within the Eurozone countries. The other major advantage is that the 
risk guarantors -the individual households in the seven countries- get paid for such risk taking. The risks 
involved are minimal as the 10 countries can fund their government bond obligations, not on wrongly 
“perceived risks” but on actual realised risks. By lowering the overall risk level in the Eurozone countries 
all countries -including all households- benefit. Of course, the criterion for assisting the 10 countries is that 
they apply the fiscal pact requirements. Executing such a balancing act has to be done on a daily basis;  
only the ECB is up to this task. The European Financial Stability Fund cannot operate in the required  
manner. The financial markets will relish this type of market stabilisation by the ECB and private sector  
fund  flows  will  soon  return  directly  to  the  higher  paying  Eurozone  countries,  making  intervention 
unnecessary.
4.3.4 Future Risk Management
Governments  have  high  levels  of  debt.  Rather  than  increasing  such  levels  further,  they  might  start 
considering when some of this debt can be repaid.  Central banks operate monetary policies to maintain  
price stability, set the interest rates and provide liquidity to economies. They might consider that currently 
individual households do not want more liquidity as they are paying off both mortgage and consumer debt  
out of current incomes and savings. They also might consider that multinationals and large companies are 
holding  substantial  sums  of  money  in  cash,  as  the  economic  outlook  remains  too  uncertain.  These 
companies also do not need additional liquidity. Banks in some countries which experience capital flight  
do need the liquidity, but one may consider that the causes of such capital flight originate in the illiquidity  
of the asset classes and that possible solutions other than providing liquidity are needed. Finally central 
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banks may also consider that their customers: individual households and companies are better served by 
stable interest and exchange rates rather than volatile ones. 
Once economic growth levels have been restored to long term sustainable high levels, once employment  
levels are also at  sustainably low levels and once managerial  errors by the financial,  commercial  and  
government sector have been reduced, the question arises what to do in an “overshoot” situation, whereby 
financial market exuberance runs away from reality.
To calm markets  down under these circumstances,  governments  can consider to run budget  surpluses, 
which make it possible to pay back some of the outstanding government debt obligations. Such actions  
reduce the Country Profit level as the credit multiples in a society are reduced. In the case of the U.S., a  
reduction in government  deficit  funding can easily be combined with the economic easing method.  If  
financial  markets  still  run  away  on  being  over-optimistic  the  FED  could  consider  buying  up  some 
government bonds, not with the purpose to resell  them, but with the purpose to eliminate them out of  
government budget surpluses in future.
Two subjects  have not  been mentioned yet:  international  trade and exchange rates.  China as  a major 
exporter to the world has seen its exports drop to both the U.S. and to European countries. This shows how 
much Country Profit  making is  an interrelated business between countries.  China has used its  foreign  
exchange reserves to support the value at risk for especially the U.S. and particularly through buying up a  
share in U.S. government debt. In this way it has been of help to fund the U.S. government’s deficit. This  
can only be a short term solution. In the longer run each country needs to balance its current accounts, so  
that capital movements are movements used to strengthen the productive base of countries. When most  
countries apply the Country Profit opportunities in their own countries, exchange rates are likely to show 
more stability as there will be less reason to speculate on the outcome of the economic process.
5. Conclusions
If one would choose which data most closely resemble the actions of individual households collectively,  
the choice would not be the economic growth data but the balance sheet of households and in particular the 
net worth data. The latter -especially the changes in net worth from one year to the next- provide the  
perfect  reflection  of  the  combination  of  income  flows  and  value  changes  in  asset  values.  Individual  
households do have a balance sheet and a P/L account and they do have financial and non-financial assets.  
They also do react to losses on savings or threats to asset values. Economic growth data do not have such 
benefits as they reflect income and output data only. 
In the above the implications of achieving a more stable Country Profit pattern have been set out.
In  doing  so  for  the  United  States,  it  shows  that  the  U.S.  was  capable  generating  an  average  annual 
incremental value in net worth, which we have called “Country Profit”, of U.S.$3.4 trillion  for the period 
1995-2005. The average net asset value -the value at risk amount- for the individual households combined 
was U.S. $42.357 trillion over the same period. The return over assets employed (return on equity, the 
value at risk) was on average 7.67% during 1996-2006.
For the U.K. the average annual Country Profit levels were UK£461 billion over the period 2003-2006, 
while  the  net  assets  employed  were UK£5.662 trillion.  The average return over  assets  employed  was  
8.08%.
For the U.S. the tide turned in 2007 due to the drop in the values of homes by US$1.870 trillion and still an 
increase in home mortgages of US$675 billion, reducing Country Profit by US$2.545 trillion. In 2008 the 
US suffered its largest Country Loss since at least 1985 at -US$12.612 trillion. The main elements of the  
loss were in homes at -US$3.325 trillion, loss in corporate equities at -US$3.872 trillion, loss on mutual  
fund shares at - US$1.264 trillion, loss on pension fund reserves at -US$2.982 trillion and loss on equity in  
non corporate business at -US$1.611 trillion.
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The cause of the 2008 Country Loss can be traced back to the risk originators and distributors of sub-prime 
(doubtful might have been a better term) home mortgage risks, who sold these risks to institutions around  
the world. The financial sector has been more inventive than the company sector in transferring risks to 
outsiders. When the financial sector does not follow prudent banking principles especially involving the 
housing markets,  the losses caused by this sector tend to show a greater  multiplier  than those for the  
commercial sector. This is because it affects banks in a number of ways, sometimes directly if they were 
holding the doubtful CDO’s, but certainly indirectly by a drop in house prices. It also affects households as  
their financial buffer is eroded, in two ways, again directly through lower values and secondly by having 
reduced income growth chances, either through unemployment or due to recession pressures.
The household balance sheet data since 2007 clearly show that households fight to keep their mortgage  
payments  up to date in order not  to lose their  homes.  This reduces available income for consumption  
purposes,  leading  to  reduced growth  in  demand.  The  same  data  also  show that  the  dynamic  balance 
between house price increases and increased mortgage lending has also been disturbed, taking a major  
element of economic growth out of the equation. Households both in the U.K. and the U.S. also reduced 
their consumption credit levels in real terms since 2007.
The  U.S  and  U.K.  governments’  action  to  flood  the  financial  markets  with  money,  by  buying  up 
government debts paper has had no results on Country Profit in the U.K. and only a limited result in the 
U.S. What it has done in both countries is push up inflation levels. In hindsight the U.S. would have been 
better off if the FED had accepted the mistakes of the risk originators and bought back all  sub-prime  
mortgage paper at a small discount to the original values. It could have left the home occupiers in place and 
make a financial arrangement with each of them to rent the places from the government. It could then have  
gradually released some homes of the worst offenders in non payment of rents. It simultaneously could 
have pursued the risk originators and the credit rating agencies for miss selling of risk practises, which 
should be made a commercial crime. The Fed has now spent US$2.3 trillion on bond purchases, with more 
to come, rather than say US$1 trillion. Hindsight might be useful for future crises, but not particularly for  
the current one.
My conclusion is that individual households need to be encouraged to spend more in the current year. The 
accumulated pension savings are an ideal source of funds for this purpose. The economic easing method  
could be the way forward, with pension funds being repaid out of future tax payments.
My other main conclusion is that macro-economic risk management needs strengthening. One solution 
may be to appoint a CEO Risk Manager for a country. Prevention is cheaper than a cure.
Finally the drive by households to seek “safe havens” for their cash by investing in government bonds of  
some countries has a detrimental effect on country profit making opportunities in other countries. Methods  
eliminating  such effects  for  the  Eurozone  countries  have  been  worked out  in  this  paper.  Quantitative 
Easing methods do not take away the risks to tax payers but reduce the rewards to them, a Country Profit  
reducing method.
Drs Kees de Koning
Chorleywood, United Kingdom
8th September 2012
E-mail: keesdekoning008@hotmail.com 
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Statistical Appendices
Appendix 1: Key Economic Data
1. United Kingdom
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Year
10 year govt bond yield
     
  
Inflation Rate
(Aug-July)
  
   
Govt Debt
To  GDP 
rate
  
Economic Growth
(Aug-July)
  
Unemployment
Rate
(Aug-July)
    
House Price(Real)
Index
Nationwide
(2007=100)
      
Net Worth
Ind.
Households
(x £billion)
Year end
   
August 07  5.1% 2.6% 43.4%  3.5% 5.5% 100 6,808
August 08  4.75% 2.6% 44.5%  -1.2% 5.4%  85.5 5,967
August 09  3.8% 3.2% 54.4%  -4.4% 6.5%  84 6,568
August 10  3.4% 3.0% 69.6%   2.1% 8.0%  83.8 7,034
August 11  2.75% 3.9% 79.6%   0.7% 8.0%  79.3 7,045
August 12  1.6% 3.5% 85.7%  -0.5% 8.25%  76.4 Not yet known
Source: Tradingeconomics.com columns 1 - 5; column 6 Nationwide Building Society; column 7U.K. Office of National Statistics
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2. United States of America
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Year
10 year govt bond yield Inflation 
Rate 
(August-
July)
Govt Debt 
to  GDP 
rate
Economic  Growth 
(Aug-July)
Unemployment 
Rate (Aug-July)
S&P  Case-Shiller 
Home  price  index 
(2000=100)
Net  Worth  Ind. 
Households  (x 
$trillion)
Year end
August 07 4.75% 2.5% 66.6% 1.9% 4.5% 197.37 66.166
August 08 4.0% 3.6% 67.2% -0.4% 5.4% 164.65 53.555
August 09 3.8% 0.8% 69.4% -3.5% 7.9% 146.11 59.160
August 10 3.0% 1.3% 89.9% 3.0% 9.7% 148.41 60.857
August 11 2.6% 2.2% 98.5% 3.1% 9.3% 142.77 58.088(Sept)
August 12 1.6% 2.7% 103.0% 1.75% 8.5% 134.2(March) 62.866(March)
Source: Tradingeconomics.com columns 1 -5: column 6 Standard and Poor; column 7 Federal  Reserve B 100 Balance Sheet  of  Households and Nonprofit  
Organizations
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3. Federal Republic of Germany
Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
10 year govt bond yield Inflation
Rate
(August-
July)
Govt
Debt to GDP 
Ratio
Economic Growth
(Aug-July)
Unemployment
Rate
(Aug-July)
House Price Index
2002=100
August 07 4.3% 1.7% 67.6% 3.2%   9.7% 104.3
August 08 4.3% 2.9% 64.9% 1.0%   8.2% 107.4
August 09 3.5% 1.2% 66.7% -5.2%   7.9% 106.9
August 10 2.6% 0.7% 74.4% 3.7%   8.0% 107.5
August 11 2.4% 1.9% 83.0% 3.0%   7.3% 110.2
August 12 1.4% 2.2% 81.2% 0.5%   6.8% 113.5 (July)
Source: Tradingeconomics.com columns 1- 5, pfandbrief.de/cms/ column 6
21
When Capitalism No Longer Works - A Profit Warning © Drs Kees de Koning
4. Spain
Year
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
10 year govt bond yield Inflation
Rate
(August-
July)
 Govt
Debt to GDP 
Ratio
Economic Growth
(Aug-July)
Unemployment
Rate
(Aug-July)
House Price Index
2007=100
August 07 4.4% 2.6% 39.6%  3.5%  8.3% 100
August 08 4.7% 4.1% 36.1%  0. 9%  9.2%  93.8
August 09 4.0% 1.2% 40.2% -3.4% 15.1%  85.2
August 10 4.0% 0.9% 53.9% -0.1% 19.2%  84.3
August 11 6.3% 3.0% 61.2%  0.7% 20.6%  76.3
August 12 6.5% 2.2% 68.5% -1.3% 24.6%  68.6 (1Qtr)
Source: Trading Economic columns 1-5; Source: INE, Instituto Nacional de Estadistica (Spanish National Statistics Office), column 6
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5. Italy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year
10 year govt bond yield Inflation
Rate
(August-
July)
 Govt
Debt to GDP 
Ratio
Economic Growth
(Aug-July)
Unemployment
Rate
(Aug-July)
House Price Index
2007=100
August 07 4.6% 1.8% 106.6% 2.4% 6.2% 100
August 08 4.8% 2.7% 103.6% 0.5% 6.5% 102.6
August 09 4.1% 1.9% 105.7% -4.4% 7.9% 102.2
August 10 3.8% 1.1% 116.0% -1.2% 8.5% 102.3
August 11 5.1% 2.2% 118.6% 1.2% 8.2% 103.0
August 12 5.8% 3.2% 120.1% -1.0% 10.7% (July) Not yet known
Sources: Trading Economics Columns 1-5 Source: European Central Bank Column 6
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Appendix 2: United  States:  Country  Profit,  Return  on  Equity,  Financial  Assets/Total  Assets; 
Liabilities/Total Assets 1996 - 2012
Year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country Profit/
(Loss)
x US$ trillion
Return on
Equity
%
Financial Assets/
Total Assets %
Liabilities/
Total Assets %
1996 1.894 6.50 66.3 15.2
1997 3.859 12.05 68.0 14.5
1998 3.950 11.00 68.8 14.0
1999 5.105 12.61 70.0 13.6
2000 0.264 0.61 66.7 14.5
2001 (0.148) -0.34 64.0 15.6
2002 (1.034) -2.43 60.7 17.2
2003 5.922 13.14 62.2 17.0
2004 6.941 13.48 62.3 16.7
2005 6.261 10.78 61.2 16.6
2006 4.424 6.97 63.2 16.9
2007 0.518 0.79 64.9 17.7
2008 (12.612) -21.07 63.3 20.8
2009 2.040 3.74 65.8 20.0
2010 3.565 6.21 67.8 18.8
2011 0.878 1.47 68.3 (Qtr 4) 18.3 (Qtr 4)
2012 2.828 (Qtr 1) 68.8 (Qtr 1) 17.6% (Qtr 1)
Source: Federal Reserve: Balance Sheet of Households and Nonprofit Organizations B.100
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Appendix  3:  United  Kingdom:  Country  Profit,  Return  on  Equity,  Financial  Assets/Total  Assets,  
Liabilities/ Total Assets
Year
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Country Profit/
(Loss)
x UK£ billion
Return on
Equity %
Financial Assets/
Total Assets %
Liabilities/
Total Assets %
2002 - - 49.4 16.9
2003 430.3 9.04 48.9 17.4
2004 431.1 8.31 47.9 18.0
2005 475.8 8.43 50.1 17.6
2006 504.9 8.23 49.7 18.1
2007 420.9 6.38 48.3 18.3
2008 (841.2) -13.2 48.1 20.6
2009 601.2 9.59 50.0 18.9
2010 466.3 6.86 50.2 18.0
2011 10.3 0.15 49.9 17.9
Source: Office of National Statistics 10.10 Households & Non-Profit Institutions Serving Households 
(NPISH): Total Net Worth by Asset and Year
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